August 2, 2026
AI System Threat Modeling: A Guide to Mapping ML Pipeline Risks
AI System Threat Modeling: A Guide to Mapping ML Pipeline Risks
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Fiza Nadeem is an SEO content writer at ioSENTRIX with 2.5+ years of experience in content writing, copywriting, and SEO.
Industrial environments are becoming more connected than ever. Manufacturing plants, energy facilities, water systems, transportation networks, and other critical infrastructure increasingly rely on connected technologies to monitor and control physical operations.
Systems that were once isolated are now connected to enterprise networks, remote access platforms, cloud services, and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices.
This connectivity brings operational benefits, but it also creates new cybersecurity risks. A compromised workstation can potentially provide a path into an operational technology (OT) environment.
From there, an attacker may reach systems such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs), human-machine interfaces (HMIs), remote terminal units (RTUs), or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
The consequences can go beyond stolen data. A cyberattack against an industrial environment can disrupt production, affect system availability, manipulate physical processes, or create safety concerns.
NIST notes that OT security must account for requirements that are especially important in these environments, including performance, reliability, and safety.
This is where ICS penetration testing becomes important. It helps organizations identify and validate security weaknesses across industrial control systems and connected OT environments before attackers can exploit them.
However, ICS penetration testing is not simply traditional IT penetration testing applied to a different network. The testing approach must consider operational continuity, device sensitivity, safety requirements, and the potential impact of testing on physical processes.
ICS penetration testing is a controlled security assessment of industrial control systems and their supporting infrastructure to identify and validate vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. The objective is to understand how an attacker could gain access, move through the environment, manipulate systems, or affect industrial operations.
An ICS environment can contain many interconnected technologies. These may include PLCs that control equipment, SCADA systems that provide supervisory monitoring, HMIs used by operators, engineering workstations used to configure industrial equipment, and network infrastructure that connects these components.
A penetration test examines the security of these systems from an attacker's perspective. Depending on the agreed scope, testing may include the OT environment itself, the IT/OT boundary, remote access infrastructure, IIoT devices, and IT systems that could provide a path into operational networks.
ICS penetration testing is different from a basic vulnerability scan. A vulnerability assessment generally identifies potential weaknesses by scanning systems, checking versions, reviewing configurations, or comparing software against known vulnerabilities.
Penetration testing goes further by validating whether important weaknesses can actually be used as part of a realistic attack path.
In OT environments, however, validation must be carefully controlled. A technique that is acceptable against a conventional IT server could interrupt an industrial controller or affect a production process.
For this reason, the testing scope, rules of engagement, safety requirements, maintenance windows, and permitted techniques should be established before testing begins.
NIST's OT guidance emphasizes that security controls and assessment activities need to be adapted to the unique requirements of operational environments rather than treating OT systems exactly like conventional IT systems.
The exact scope depends on the industrial environment and the organization's objectives. Common systems and components can include:
NIST identifies technologies such as ICS, SCADA, DCS, and PLCs as important components within OT environments. The scope should be based on risk and operational importance.
Testing every component in the same way is neither practical nor safe. Critical systems may require passive assessment, lab-based validation, or other controlled techniques instead of direct exploitation.
The terms ICS, OT, SCADA, and IIoT are closely related, but they do not mean the same thing. Understanding the difference makes it easier to understand what an ICS penetration test actually covers.
Operational Technology (OT) refers to hardware and software that monitors or directly interacts with physical processes, equipment, and environments.
OT is broader than industrial control systems alone. It can include technologies used in manufacturing, energy, transportation, building automation, physical access systems, and other environments where digital systems interact with the physical world.
This is one of the main differences between OT and traditional IT.
IT systems are generally focused on processing, storing, and communicating information. OT systems are concerned with monitoring and controlling physical processes.
An IT security incident might expose customer information or disrupt an application. An OT incident can also affect machinery, production, physical processes, or safety.
NIST defines OT broadly as programmable systems and devices that interact with the physical environment or manage devices that do so.
An Industrial Control System (ICS) is a group of control technologies used to monitor and control industrial processes. ICS environments can include PLCs, SCADA systems, DCS platforms, RTUs, HMIs, industrial networks, and supporting systems.
For example, a manufacturing plant may use PLCs to control machinery, HMIs to give operators visibility into the process, and SCADA or DCS platforms to monitor and manage operations. ICS is therefore an important part of OT, but OT is the broader category.
SCADA, or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, is a type of industrial control system used to monitor and supervise processes, often across distributed locations.
A SCADA environment may include:
SCADA systems collect information from field devices and make it available to operators. Depending on the architecture, they can also allow authorized users to send commands to industrial equipment.
From a security perspective, a compromise of a SCADA environment can therefore have implications beyond the loss of information. An attacker who gains sufficient access may be able to interfere with monitoring or control functions.
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) refers to connected sensors, devices, machines, gateways, and other technologies used to collect and exchange data in industrial environments.
IIoT can improve visibility and automation, but it can also expand the attack surface. Devices may communicate with cloud platforms, APIs, mobile applications, enterprise systems, or other industrial components.
Security weaknesses in an IIoT device can therefore create risks beyond the device itself. Examples include weak authentication, insecure firmware, exposed services, insecure APIs, and poorly protected communication channels.
This is why modern ICS penetration testing may need to consider IIoT devices and their connections as part of the wider attack surface.
A simple way to understand the relationship is:
ICS → control systems used within OT.
OT → the broader operational environment.
SCADA → a type of supervisory control and monitoring system.
IIoT → connected industrial devices, sensors, and platforms that can interact with the operational environment.
These categories can overlap. An industrial facility may use IIoT sensors to collect information, send that information through gateways or networks, integrate it with SCADA or other control platforms, and connect selected systems to enterprise IT.
OWASP's OT guidance similarly describes OT as a broad environment containing systems and devices that interact with the physical world, while its scope includes technologies such as SCADA, HMIs, and other industrial equipment.
An ICS penetration test should be tailored to the organization's architecture, risk profile, and operational requirements. It can examine network security, industrial protocols, control devices, remote access, IIoT components, and the connections between IT and OT.
The following areas are commonly considered during an assessment.
OT networks should be assessed to determine whether attackers can move from less trusted environments into sensitive operational systems.
Testing may examine:
The goal is not simply to identify open ports. Testers need to understand how systems communicate and whether the architecture limits unnecessary access.
For example, if an attacker compromises an enterprise workstation, the assessment can determine whether network controls prevent that system from reaching sensitive OT assets.
Segmentation is particularly important because a vulnerable system does not necessarily have to be removed from the environment if strong controls prevent it from becoming a pathway to more critical systems.
Industrial environments rely on protocols designed for reliable communication between control devices. Depending on the environment, these may include:
Testing can examine how these protocols are implemented and whether communications are adequately protected. Potential issues can include weak authentication, insufficient protection of communications, unauthorized commands, insecure configurations, and protocol misuse.
The objective is not to attack every protocol aggressively. Instead, testers should determine whether weaknesses in industrial communications could support a realistic attack path and what operational consequences that path could have.
PLCs and RTUs can be central to industrial operations. A security assessment may examine whether unauthorized users can access, reconfigure, or interact with these devices.
Testing can include:
The sensitivity of these devices makes testing methodology especially important. A controlled review may be appropriate for one controller, while another may require testing in a lab or replicated environment.
SCADA servers and HMIs provide important visibility and control functions. Their security can directly affect an operator's ability to monitor or manage an industrial process.
An assessment may review:
Testing can also examine whether an attacker who compromises a supporting workstation or server could reach sensitive SCADA components. The goal is to understand the complete attack path instead of evaluating each system in isolation.
Remote access is often necessary for maintenance, troubleshooting, and vendor support. It can also create a pathway into an OT environment. Testing may review:
The assessment should determine whether remote users have more access than necessary and whether controls such as strong authentication, segmentation, and access restrictions limit potential abuse.
Third-party access deserves particular attention because an external account or support connection may provide a route around internal security controls.
IIoT systems introduce additional components and communication paths into industrial environments. Testing may examine:
ioSENTRIX's ICS, IoT, and IIoT penetration testing service specifically describes testing across firmware, communication protocols, device integrations, authentication, and access controls.
The wider objective is to determine whether a weakness in a connected industrial device could be used to reach more sensitive systems or affect business-critical operations.
One of the biggest practical differences between IT and OT testing is the need to carefully manage how testers interact with live systems.
In a conventional IT environment, security teams may have more freedom to scan, enumerate, and exploit systems. In OT, even seemingly routine activity can have operational consequences depending on the device and process.
For that reason, ICS penetration testing may combine passive techniques, controlled active testing, lab validation, and other methods.
Passive testing collects information without actively sending potentially disruptive requests to industrial devices. It may include:
Passive assessment can help testers understand what exists in the environment before deciding whether active testing is appropriate. This is particularly useful when organizations have incomplete asset inventories or when certain devices cannot tolerate conventional scanning.
Active testing involves controlled interaction with systems to validate security weaknesses. Depending on the scope and safety requirements, this can include:
Active testing should never be treated as a default requirement for every OT asset. The objective is to obtain meaningful security assurance while keeping operational risk within agreed limits.
Active testing may need to be restricted or avoided when:
The decision should be based on the specific asset and process rather than a blanket rule. For critical systems, organizations may use lab environments, replicas, digital twins, firmware analysis, passive monitoring, or other lower-risk methods to validate security concerns.
NIST's guidance makes clear that OT security has to balance cybersecurity with performance, reliability, and safety requirements.
Standards and security frameworks can help organizations structure their OT security programs and assess risks consistently. They should support the penetration testing process rather than turn the assessment into a checklist exercise.
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, provides guidance for securing OT while accounting for its unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements.
The publication covers OT architectures, threats, vulnerabilities, risk management, and recommended safeguards. The latest revision also expanded its scope from primarily ICS to the broader OT environment.
For penetration testing, NIST SP 800-82 can help organizations understand why assessment methods must be adapted to the operational environment.
The ISA/IEC 62443 series provides cybersecurity standards for industrial automation and control systems. The series addresses security across the industrial control system lifecycle and considers different stakeholders, including asset owners, suppliers, integrators, and service providers.
It also addresses risk assessment, system security requirements, component security, and secure development.
For organizations conducting ICS penetration testing, IEC 62443 can provide useful context for evaluating security requirements and identifying weaknesses within an industrial automation environment.
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS provides a knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques relevant to industrial control environments. Its ICS matrix includes tactics such as Initial Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement, Command and Control, Impair Process Control, Inhibit Response Function, and Impact.
This makes it useful for thinking about ICS security from an attack-path perspective. Instead of asking only whether a vulnerability exists, security teams can consider how an adversary might use that weakness to move through the environment or affect a control process.
The Purdue Model is commonly used to represent industrial network architecture in layers or levels. It helps organizations understand how enterprise IT systems, industrial networks, control systems, and field devices relate to one another.
In security assessments, the model can help teams review segmentation and communication paths between different parts of the environment.
The important point is that the Purdue Model should not be treated as a security control by itself. A network can follow a layered architecture and still have weak access controls, poorly configured firewalls, or unsafe connections between zones.
ICS penetration testing requires more planning than many conventional security assessments. The technology, operational environment, and business requirements can all affect how testing should be performed.
Industrial environments often contain systems that were designed and deployed long before today's cybersecurity requirements.
Some equipment may be difficult to patch, difficult to replace, or dependent on older software and protocols. This means a tester cannot simply recommend upgrading every vulnerable component.
The assessment should identify the actual risk and consider compensating controls such as segmentation, access restrictions, monitoring, or isolation where replacement is not practical.
In IT, a temporary service interruption may be inconvenient. In OT, an interruption can potentially affect production, equipment, or safety.
This changes how penetration testers approach the environment. The goal is not to prove every vulnerability through the most aggressive method possible. The goal is to obtain sufficient evidence to understand and reduce risk without creating unnecessary operational exposure.
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You cannot effectively secure assets you do not know exist. Industrial environments can contain older controllers, unmanaged devices, temporary connections, vendor equipment, and systems that are not fully represented in enterprise asset inventories.
Discovery and network mapping are therefore important parts of an ICS penetration test.
IT and OT teams may have different priorities, processes, and ownership models. IT teams often focus on confidentiality and enterprise security, while OT teams may prioritize availability, reliability, process stability, and safety.
Successful testing requires both groups to understand the scope, risks, responsibilities, and escalation procedures.
Some vulnerabilities are easy to reproduce in a conventional IT environment but much harder to validate safely in a live industrial system. For example, directly modifying a controller or sending unexpected commands may demonstrate a vulnerability but also create operational risk.
In such cases, testers may rely on controlled validation, test environments, protocol analysis, configuration evidence, or other methods to establish the practical impact.
Industrial systems require a security-testing approach that recognizes the difference between protecting information and protecting physical operations.
Traditional IT penetration testing remains important, but it does not always provide the visibility needed to understand risks within PLCs, SCADA systems, HMIs, industrial networks, IIoT devices, and IT/OT connections.
ICS penetration testing provides a more focused way to identify weaknesses across these environments and understand how they could contribute to realistic attack paths.
The right approach is not to test OT systems as aggressively as possible. It is to test them appropriately. That means understanding the architecture, identifying critical assets, defining safe testing boundaries, validating vulnerabilities carefully, and connecting technical findings to operational risk.
ioSENTRIX offers ICS, IoT, and IIoT penetration testing designed to assess industrial and connected-device environments. Its published approach includes scoping and discovery, assessment of firmware and communication protocols, testing of device integrations, manual and automated techniques, detailed reporting, remediation guidance, and retesting.
For organizations operating industrial environments or critical infrastructure, a specialized assessment can provide valuable insight into where OT security weaknesses exist and which risks should be addressed first.
Book a demo with ioSENTRIX's security experts to discuss your ICS/OT security requirements and request an ICS/OT security assessment.
ICS penetration testing is a controlled security assessment of industrial control systems and their supporting infrastructure. It identifies and validates vulnerabilities that could allow unauthorized access, system manipulation, lateral movement, or disruption of industrial operations.
The biggest difference is the potential impact of testing and compromise. IT penetration testing usually focuses on systems such as applications, servers, endpoints, and networks. ICS penetration testing must also consider physical processes and operational continuity.
In OT environments, a successful attack could potentially affect equipment, production, process control, or safety. As a result, ICS testing typically places greater emphasis on controlled testing, passive assessment, segmentation, operational context, and carefully defined rules of engagement.
The scope depends on the organization and its objectives. Testing can include SCADA servers, PLCs, HMIs, RTUs, DCS components, engineering workstations, historians, industrial networks, OT firewalls, remote access infrastructure, IIoT devices, and IT/OT interfaces.
It can be performed safely when the engagement is carefully scoped and managed, but no active testing method should be assumed to be risk-free. Before testing, the organization and testing team should define rules of engagement, identify systems that must not be touched, establish communication and escalation procedures, consider maintenance windows, and determine which techniques are permitted.
There is no single testing frequency that is appropriate for every industrial environment. Organizations should consider their risk profile, system criticality, regulatory or contractual requirements, architecture changes, IT/OT connectivity, major technology deployments, remote access changes, and significant vulnerabilities affecting their environment.
