Scope · Day 1Mapping · Day 2Exploitation · Day 3Report · Day 8Retest · Day 20
ScopeMapExploitReportRetest01The attack path, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK
02The role that made it possible
03The result
01DISCOVERY
Public bucket lists an old backup file
T1619 PublicAccess blocked02CREDENTIAL ACCESS
Access key found inside the backup
T1552.001 Valid keyKey revoked03INITIAL ACCESS
Act as the deploy role
T1078.004 Role assumedOne bucket only04PRIVILEGE ESCALATION
Pass an admin role to a new function
T1548.005 AdminDenied · guardrail05COLLECTION
Read every customer upload
T1530 14 buckets readNot reacheddeploy-role · permissions policydeploy-role · the fix, as a diff
1{
2 "effect": "allow",
3 "actions": ["storage:*", "functions:*", "roles:assign"],
4 "resources": "*"
5}
-"actions": ["storage:*", "functions:*", "roles:assign"],
-"resources": "*"
+"actions": ["storage:read", "storage:write"],
+"resources": "bucket: deploy-artifacts" // narrowed to one bucket
+Org-wide guardrail: block granting admin roles to any function
REPORT AND WALKTHROUGH · DAY 8Revoke the key, narrow the role to its one bucket, add a guardrail that blocks admin roles.
RETEST · DAY 20Each step retested from the agreed starting points. The path to production data is closed.
OBJECTIVE AGREED WITH YOU
Production data, starting from the internetNot reachedReached · Day 3RetestingPath closed
WHAT ONE LEAKED KEY REACHESWHAT THE DEPLOY ROLE REACHES ON RETEST
Nothing yetOne public bucketA valid deploy keyDeploy role · 3 bucketsAccount adminAdmin · 14 buckets readIts own bucket only
CONFIGURATION REVIEW · SAME ENGAGEMENT
–✕✓Public access controls
–✕✓Key rotation
–✕✓Least-privilege roles
Mapped toMITRE ATT&CK CloudCIS Foundations BenchmarksAWS · Azure · Google CloudRetest of every fix