Penetration Testing

How a locked-down kiosk browser led to domain administrator access

Client
Professional services firm
Service
Full-stack penetration testing
Findings
10+, including 3 Critical
Verified
Critical and High fixed; retested by ioSENTRIX
The challenge

What did the client need?

A professional services firm was about to launch an internal web application that manages its clients’ sensitive cases. Users could reach it only through a virtual desktop that showed nothing but a kiosk-mode browser, watched by a security operations centre.

Engagement details

Client
Professional services firm
Product
Internal web application for sensitive client cases
Scope
Web application, its virtual desktop (Citrix) environment and the network behind it
Access
Black-box, kiosk-mode browser only
Engagement
A multi-week engagement before launch
Verified
Critical and High fixed; retested by ioSENTRIX
Tested by
ioSENTRIX application and network testers
Our approach

How did ioSENTRIX approach it?

Testing started from the same kiosk window a real user sees, then treated the browser, the virtual desktop and the network as one target, the way a compromised user would.

The report gave each finding a severity rating against NIST standards, with evidence and a remediation plan, and ioSENTRIX helped the client prioritise the most severe issues.

What we found

What did ioSENTRIX find?

A kiosk-only start, a full compromise of the network, and gaps in the application itself.

Theme · InfrastructureFinding 1

A locked-down kiosk led to domain administrator

Our testers broke through the restrictions of the virtual desktop and launched built-in tools such as Explorer and Notepad. That opened the way to internal reconnaissance, which turned up several internally hosted applications, and then to privilege escalation and administrator access to the domain controller.

Business impact. A user limited to one browser window could have taken control of the whole network.

Theme · Web applicationFinding 2

The application skipped checks it needed

The web application itself had cross-site scripting and missing authorisation checks of the kind needed to protect critical data.

Business impact. Sensitive client case data could have been exposed or changed by users who should not see it.

One chain from a kiosk-mode browser to the domain controller
One chain · kiosk to domain admin
  1. 1Kiosk escapedtools launched
  2. 2Network mappedinternal apps found
  3. 3Privileges raiseddomain controller
Outcome: Domain admin (from a kiosk-only start)
The impact

What changed as a result?

Our testers broke out of the kiosk, mapped the internal network and escalated privileges to administrator on the domain controller. In the application, they found cross-site scripting and missing authorisation checks. The client remediated the findings before launch, and ioSENTRIX retested the fixes.

1
kiosk browser as the only way in
10+
findings, 3 of them Critical
3
layers tested: application, virtual desktop and network

How many findings, and how severe?

10+ findings in total, including 3 Critical and 2 High.

  • Critical 3
  • High 2
  • Medium
  • Low

What changed after the test?

What changed before launch
AreaBefore the testAfter remediation
Domain controlA kiosk user could escalate to administrator on the domain controllerCritical issues, including the privilege escalation, mitigated
ApplicationCross-site scripting and missing authorisation checks on sensitive dataFixed by the client’s staff, prioritised by severity
LaunchA sensitive application about to go live with unknown riskLaunched with the findings addressed; fixes retested by ioSENTRIX

✓ Verification: Critical and High fixed before launch; retested by ioSENTRIX.

Key insight

One escape from a kiosk window led all the way to the domain controller.

Lessons

Lessons for launch teams

01

Kiosk mode is not a boundary

A locked-down browser was one breakout from the desktop. Treat the virtual desktop as part of the attack surface, not as its edge.

Finding 1
02

Test the whole stack together

The app, its virtual desktop and its network failed as one chain. Testing any layer alone would have missed the route to the domain.

Approach
03

Authorise every request

Missing authorisation checks exposed sensitive data. Being inside the network is not permission to see a record.

Finding 2 · OWASP Top 10 (2021) A01: Broken Access Control
Next step

Launching a sensitive application? See a sample full-stack test report or book a strategy session before go-live.

Service
Penetration testing
Explore the service

Details in this case study are anonymised and generalised. Methods that could harm other products are withheld.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

What did ioSENTRIX test in this case study?

A professional services firm was about to launch an internal web application that manages its clients’ sensitive cases. Users could reach it only through a virtual desktop that showed nothing but a kiosk-mode browser, watched by a security operations centre.

What was the most serious issue?

A locked-down kiosk led to domain administrator. A user limited to one browser window could have taken control of the whole network.

How many findings were there, and how severe?

10+ findings in total, including 3 Critical and 2 High.

Were the fixes verified?

Critical and High fixed before launch; retested by ioSENTRIX.

Which ioSENTRIX service does this case study cover?

Penetration testing, delivered by the ioSENTRIX application and network testers.

Which standards does this align with?

OWASP Top 10 (2021) A01: Broken Access Control. These are cited as alignment guidance, not a compliance claim.

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